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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. PAINTER'S "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
IS, IN CERTAIN IMPORTANT PARTICULARS, 
INACCURATE AND MISLEADING. 
1. Mr. Painter would apparently have the Court draw the 
inference, from points denominated 2, 3, and 9 of his "State-
ment of Facts" (Respondent's Brief at 1-4), that Mr. Smurthwaite 
expected nothing from Mr. Painter other than a place for his 
horses to stay. Mr. Smurthwaite concedes, as he forthrightly 
acknowledged at trial, that he expected Mr. Painter neither to 
feed the horses nor to go out of his way actively to inspect 
them. That acknowledgment does not, however, lead inexorably 
to the conclusion that Mr. Smurthwaite expected nothing by way 
of care from Mr. Painter. The essence of Mr. Smurthwaite's 
testimony with respect to his expectations is that he expected 
Mr. Painter to exercise at least a modicum of sensory concern 
and, when reasonably necessary, promptly to communicate his 
actual knowledge of developments that might significantly 
endanger the well-being of the horses: 
He would call me. He would notify me if 
any horse was sick, if any horse was 
injured, if any mare was having her colt 
. . . . [I]f the horses needed anything, 
all he had to do was call and I could come 
up and take care of whatever emergency was 
existing. 
Tr., Vol. II, at 31; 
Q. But there was no requirement that 
[Mr. Painter] actually get out into this 
pasture and walk up and inspect horses 
there. 
A. Well, other than that he said he would look 
after them. 
Id. at 76-77; 
A. . . . If [Mr. Painter] wasn't going to tell 
me about my horses, I wouldn't pasture 70 
miles away [round-trip]. 
Id. at 93. 
2. Point 4 of Mr. Painter's "Statement of Facts" (Respon-
dent's Brief at 2) contains what appears to be an erroneous 
statement of law: 
At all times Smurthwaite had complete access to 
and control over his own horses in connection 
with . . . taking horses away from the subject 
pasturage. 
As pointed out at page 15 of Appellant's Brief, Utah Code 
Annotated §38-2-1, the "agistors' lien" statute, provides a 
lien right for those who, among other things, pasture animals 
for others and expressly allows them to retain possession of 
animals pastured until payment is made for amounts due pursuant 
to such pasturing arrangements. As is also pointed out at 
page 15 of Appellant's Brief and as appears clearly from the 
record (Tr., Vol. II, at 56-58, 244-45, 268; Tr., Vol. Ill, at 
17), Mr. Smurthwaite was in arrears on his payment obligation 
when the horses died. 
Furthermore, inasmuch as Mr. Painter himself asserted 
(with respect to Mr. Smurthwaite1s surviving horses) his 
agistor's (or pasturer's) lien right, it is not at all clear 
that Mr. Painter would have allowed Mr. Smurthwaite to remove 
the horses from the land. 
3. Point 5 of Mr. Painter's "Statement of Facts" (Respon-
dent's Brief at 2) might, if unexplained, cause the reader to 
conclude that Mr. Smurthwaite had, for sustenance purposes, 
"fed" his horses. There is simply no factual or record sup-
port for that proposition, either at the places cited by 
Mr. Painter or elsewhere. The only "feeding" that 
Mr. Smurthwaite did, while the horses that died were kept on 
Mr. Painter's land, was incidental feeding that was done in 
furtherance of inspection and "re-acquaintance" purposes. 
See, e.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 44-45. This fact is important in 
light of (1) the fact that the horses ultimately died of star-
vation; (2) the fact that the horses had not required supple-
mental feed in addition to the naturally available pasturage 
in the two winters previous to the one during which they died; 
(3) the fact that Mr. Smurthwaite testified that he thought 
that Mr. Painter would notify him if the horses needed supple-
mental feed (see, e.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 30, 31, 35; Vol. Ill, 
At 68-69); and (4) the fact that the failure of communication 
concerning the horses1 need for feed was and remains at the 
very heart of this dispute. 
Point 5 might also cause the reader to conclude that 
Mr. Smurthwaite1s failure to inspect his horses subsequent 
to early December 1983 was arbitrary or unreasonable. As 
Mr. Smurthwaite explained at trial, however, Mr. Painter had 
by then earned his trust (or so he thought) and 
It was not a breeding season. It was not a 
foaling season. I had two winters to believe 
that they would survive. I had Mr. Painter's 
word that he would let me know if anything 
happened. Why drive 70 miles just to look at 
the snow and the horses[?] 
Tr., Vol. II, at 93. 
4. Point 7 of Mr. Painter's "Statement of Facts" (Respon-
dent's Brief at 3) appears to stem from his misunderstanding 
of Mr. Smurthwaite's position concerning timing of the expected 
(by Mr. Smurthwaite) moving (by Mr. Painter) of the horses 
from the lower pasture to the upper pasture (where the tall 
crested wheat grass grew (Tr., Vol. II, at 219) and where other 
horses - those belonging to Mr. Robert Child - survived the 
winter (Tr., Vol. II, at 271)). As Mr. Smurthwaite testified, 
his concern with the location of his horses ("upper" versus 
"lower" pasture) was tied not to dates but to snow cover and 
feed availability, and, as of the last time he saw his horses, 
in December of 1983, when they were in the lower pasture, 
"[t]here was no snow on the ground, there was plenty of feed." 
Tr., Vol. II, at 95. 
5. Point 8 of Mr. Painter's "Statement of Facts" (Respon-
dent's Brief at 3) might, if unexplained, allow the inference 
to be drawn that the plowed "Sewer Company" road extended down 
into the area in the lower pasture where the horses dwindled 
and died. The important facts here are: (1) that that road 
was not plowed beyond a certain locked gate and did not allow 
meaningful access to the horses; and (2) that it was thus not 
reasonable for Mr. Painter to think that Mr. Smurthwaite was 
"checkin' on" (and, presumably, feeding) the horses, given the 
illusory nature of that "access," a road which was, in fact, 
no more likely to have been utilized than was the roadway which 
ran right past Mr. Painter's house and barn, the roadway which 
Mr. Smurthwaite had previously invariably or almost invariably 
used in the past, the roadway from which Mr. Painter had to 
use his tractor to remove the snow so that Mr. Smurthwaite's 
truck could get even remotely close to the horses. See, e.g., 
Tr., Vol. II, at 246. 
POINT II 
THE RELEVANT CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION OR 
MR. PAINTER'S POSITION THAT THE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS NOT 
AN AGISTMENT BAILMENT. 
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully contends that both the District 
Court and Mr. Painter have read the body of common law incorrectly 
and too narrowly in, respectively, determining and arguing that 
the arrangement between Messrs. Smurthwaite and Painter did 
not constitute an agistment bailment agreement. 
Mr. Painter appears to rely heavily on the obiter dictum 
statement in Cox v. Pithoud, 271 Cal.App.2d 571, 34 Cal.Rptr. 
582 (Cal.App. 1963) that the landowner there M. . . was not 
merely leasing pasture to [the animal owner] . . . ." 34 Cal. 
Rptr. at 583. Mr. Painter also seeks to distinguish the facts 
of the cases he cites from the facts underlying the instant 
dispute. Mr. Smurthwaite readily concedes that the facts of 
this case are not identical to the facts of those any of the 
cases cited by Mr. Painter but points out that, when the facts 
of any given dispute are carefully compared with those of any 
other, there is seldom, if ever, complete identity between the 
two sets of facts. The interesting thing is that in none of 
the cases discussed by Mr. Painter was an agistment bailment 
analysis made and rejected; contrariwise, the agistment rela-
tionship was found to exist in all the cases. 
Mr. Smurthwaite contends that, as a matter of general 
common law (discussed at pages 9-12 of Appellant's Brief), an 
agistment bailment agreement existed between himself and 
Mr. Painter. And the law of Utah, given the above-referenced 
agistors' lien statute (Utah Code Annotated §38-2-1), which 
includes express reference to pasturing arrangements, clearly 
favors Mr. Smurthwaite1s position, especially, perhaps, in 
light of Mr. Painter's own ultimate reliance on his possession-
retention right secured by that statute. Additionally, and as 
Mr. Painter appears to have recognized, Utah case law itself 
provides support for Mr. Smurthwaite1s position. At page 9 of 
Respondent's Brief, Mr. Painter himself describes the agreement 
between the parties in Hughes v. Yardley, 19 Utah 2d 166, 428 
P.2d 158 (1967), as follows: 
The defendants agreed to take cattle owned by 
plaintiff onto defendant's ranch and pasture 
them from May 1, 1964 to October 1, 1964. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Page 9 of Respondent's Brief concludes with the following 
analysis: 
In none of the cases cited by Appellant is 
there really an issue as to the existence of a 
bailment. The existence of a bailment was 
clear because in each of the cases there was a 
taking into custody by the bailee and caring 
for the animals, usually for a specified term. 
In each of the cited cases the parties expressly 
agreed to terms which constituted a bailment 
and the bailee was aware of his duty to care 
for the animals. 
Hughes v. Yardley was one of the "cases cited by Appellant," 
and, Mr. Smurthwaite submits, the only difference between his 
agreement with Mr. Painter and that of the parties in Hughes 
v. Yardley is that here the agreement was on a month-to-month 
basis (see, e.g., Record at 95), whereas there the agreement 
was for a five-month period. Mr. Smurthwaite suggest that, 
inasmuch as both agreements were for specific terms, the dis-
tinction is one that is without legal significance. 
CONCLUSION 
It is perhaps noteworthy that Mr. Painter has offered, in 
his Brief, no response to the important public policy concerns 
raised by Mr. Smurthwaite (Appellant's Brief at 13-14; 16-17). 
It is certainly noteworthy that Mr. Smurthwaite had put 12 or 
13 years of his life into building up his racing Appaloosa 
breeding program; that his expert estimated the broodmares and 
their unborn foals to have a value of approximately $94,000.00 
at the time or times of their deaths (Tr., Vol. I, at 57-80; 
Exhibit X); and that there was no evidence adduced that 
Mr. Smurthwaite was mentally impaired while his horses were 
starving to death. All reasonable inferences point toward the 
very reasonableness of Mr. Smurthwaitefs conduct and the unrea-
sonableness of Mr. Painter's. An agistment bailment agreement 
clearly existed and, whether the "lack-of-substantial-evidence" 
standard or the "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate review 
is applied, Mr. Smurthwaite is entitled to reversal and remand. 
Respectfully submitted this ^-^May of December, 1986. 
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